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The Background of the Anglo-French Entente
After the end of the Napoleonic wars, the appearance of
Ev~ope

was changed almost to that

or

the eighteenth century.

France had been returned to her old borders, the

mu\~itude

of little kingdoms in Italy and Germany had been reinstated,
and Russia ha.d taken back the portion of Poland that she had
acquired in 1793•

The general alliance of all European

countries against a superior France was discontinued as soon
as France had lost that position.

It had been nothing more

than one of the agreements that European countries made when
they were under
the moment.

pressure~

The enemy was only the enemy for

The wars had not changed that time-honoured

method of diplomacy.
Governments were accustomed to make their policies and
alliances without much reference to public opinions.

Inter-

national relations were supposed to be above the comprehension
of the masses.

The public did not, however, take this as an

1nd1oat1on that they should refrain from having or expressing
opinions.

The situation was simply that public opinion and

government policy seldom agreed, since what was popularly
agreeable and what was politically expedient U>eAZ: often two
separate things.

Even in Britain the public did not have

great influence on foreign affairs.

Events in France con-

1ed to make the temper of the British press rise and fall,

2

depending on what was occurring in

Paris~

However, the

British government was ready to make the settlement that
best suited the cirour;stancea.

Therefore, in 1848, England

and France oarne; to a ,,olnt nction in foreign affairs for the

first time.

That this action was based on mutual distrust

rather than on brotherly love was not significant.

What

mattered most was that e precedent had been established that
was to affect the relations of Britain and France for the
rest or the nineteenth oentury. 1 Foreign relations between
Brita.in and France were checkered but, unt1.l. the end of the
century, did not break into open and violent a.nimoas1ty.
l1he ministries of both countries• on the contrary• sought ror

1

friendly relations as the rule.

In 1848 France and Britain had

come to an amicable arrangement regarding the advancing interests of Russia around the Black Sea.2

All agreements of

this sort were expected to flounder 1f some other factor
changed the aspect

or

the situation.

In the case of Britain

and France, the problem was Greece, and in the heated debate
that followed Britain's high-handed approach to a trifling
situation, the Anglo-French alliance almost became a FrancoRussian one.

Britain, along with France and Russia, were

garentors of Greek independence.

Palmerston's rough attitude

in defending a claimant to British protection was taken as a
threat.

However, before the natural resu\;\;s of his mistake

were explored by those two countries, Napo1eon III staged his

coun d'etat 1n Paris.
Britain had known Napoleon III from the time that he had
spent in exile there, and knew him to be essentially

3

friendly to British interests.

On the other hand, both

Austria and Russia were unhappy to see a restoration of the
Bonapartists.

Russia in particular felt threatened, because

ono of France's ma jot" areas for expanding hett interests wa.s

in Turkey.3

One of Napoleon III's primary objeot1ves was agreement·
with Britain.

Throughout the Second Empire he had d1souss1ons

in Paris on current foreign policy, particularly the situation

in TUrkey befora the Crimean war.

Russia• feeling threatened

as she did, eventually went to war with Turkey, and brought
France and Britain into the conflict to proteot their common
interests in the Near East.

In this instance, Napoleon was

sucessful 1n creating the alliance.

After the war, however,

Britain became preoccupied with domestic

~eform

and, irked

by constant pressure trom Napoleon to come to the French oon-

ferenoes. finally refused to participate altogether.
attitude ended definitively the alliance

or

Her

the war.

Napoleon never gave his attempts to gain a domploto entente
with Britain.

In his final endeabOr he initiated a policy for

France that was to become a standard.

Eventually, with the

help of oircumsta.noes., this idea would lead to the .result
that he had worked so hard for. 4 When he went to war 1n 1870,
he and his government were determined to prove that the cause

or France was morally superior to that of Prussia.

This idea

did not help France at Sedan, but later, after the harshness
of Prussian peace terms in annexing Alsace-Lorraine, it
~nauired

a certain authority.

The French did not hesitate

emind the world of their plight whenever it served their

4

purpose to generate a little moral indignation in their
behalf.

After 1810. relations went back to normal between Britain
and France; that is, since the beg1ni."1ing of the French Third

Republic, a similarity

or

pr1no1ples and institutions made a

base for Br1-1:ain and France to maintain their ordinary
pleasant relations.5 As long as Franoe remained peaceful

this situation would continue, for nothing suited Britain
better than having a peaceful neighbor on the continent.
Gambette and. his colleagues were in favour of the friendly
relations, since this gave them someone to oall on if Prussia

moved against France again.

However, there was a new and

forceful imperialism growing in Franoe, whose ambitions

aimed at colonial expansion.
and

Afriea was France's best ohanoe,

it was here that France and Britain suddenly found them-

selves face to faoe in violent opposition.6
The imperialists in France were convinced that an agree•
ment ment with Britain could only be a hinderance as far as
colonial affa1rs were concerned.

While they controlled the

French government, France and Britain almost oame to blows
several times before the turn of the oentur7.

There was, how-

ever, heavy political unrest in France, since the imperialists
favoured an alliance

or

convenience with Germany, to back her

against Britain if she should have to make a stand on colonial
affairs.

The Germanophobea in France fought this settlement

bitterly, unable and unwilling to forget that Prussia had
A~~~ France so much harm in

1a70.? They believed that eventually

they would again arrive at a settlement of all problems with

Britain.

However, French public opinion in general was alive

with bad feeling for the British, especially after the affair
at Fashoda.

The mood in Britain was hardly different.

As A. J. p. Taylor so aptly noted 1 °Someone has said
that nine English traditions out

or

ten date from the la.st

third of the nineteenth century; and this is certainly true
of foreign affairs.• 8

From the end of the Napoleonic wars

in 1821, friendship, not 1nm1ty, had been the rule between
Britain and France.

Yet, a contrary idea pars1sts asserting

that France since the time of the Hundred Years WBr was the
avowed and declared enemy of Britain, that nothing could
ever make them come together in peaceful agreement, and that
the Anglo-French ententq that finally came about aftor the
turn of the century was a miracle.

Actually, Britain and

France were allies through most of that period.

It was

simply the colonial situation that so roused the presses of
ea.oh country that papers insulted one another•s leaders and
oustoms•

Not even the prestige or Victoria saved her name

in the Paris pepers.

If a settlement oould be found. for the

colonial s1tuat1on, then the real barrier to an
be gone.

entent~

would

This was the state of affairs between Britain and

France when Edward VII became king of' England in 1901.

Edward VII as He Was on neooming King

The position of a monarch, in a country as subject to
Parliamentary process as Britain• needs some examination.
The position of Queen Viotoria 1 in fact, was unique in British
history and

in the history

or

EU!•opu

By right of age and

re lat ion of some kind to every royal house in Bu.rope, .she was

able to offer her foreign office an influence in continental
courts never befdre. held by any country.

Her correspondence

was voluminous and ranged over every subject.

As the head

of a great family she was able, as a benevolent but stern
grandmother, to keep reins on anyone who seemed likely to
become a source o:f' trouble in the balance

or

Europe.

For

some time before her death, Victoria was the only person who
could keep her grandson, William II of Germany, Wlder any
kind

or

controi.9

Yet, there were things that she could not

do because of her inability to travel extensively.
The situation with Edward VII was entirely different.
Whereas he could not offer the voluminous correspondence and
the influence of age, he was exceedingly widely traveled, and
knew every sovereign in Europe personally.

He had, also,

iraveled in the Near East and the Orient. and knew many
these rulers.

or

However, Edward's favourite place to visit

was and had always been France.

Since childhood Edward had

preferred things French in contrast to his mother's preference
6

7

for things German. 10

He had friends among all walks of life

in France, as he could not exactly have in Britain, especially
among the actors and actresses of Paris.

The affection that

he held for the French was cordially returned by them and they
were accustomed to seeing him incognito at the Hotel Bristol,
strolling the boulivards and using the cafes.

His popularity

only faded during the Fashoda affair when he was violently
and vilely attacked in the Paris press as the leading

J .'·.~:,:·r:'.

representative of England, next to the Queen.
Edward's attitude towards Germany, also, comes in this
context.

He was familiar with the country of his father and

was hardly one to see a threat in everything that that country
did.

He did not regard the unification of the German states
as anything but a good occurrence. 11 However, Edward had
several reasons for disliking the situation in Germany.

These

reasons were mainly personal and yet they could not help but
affect his feeling for Germany.

In the first place, his wife,

Alexandra of Denmark, had a violent hatred for Germany because
it had taken two provinces from the southern boundary of her
country in a waF that Germany herself had provoked for that
purpose.

It was only natural that the Prince of Wales, as he

then was, should try to maintain ao impartial attitude and
yet still be drawn on the side of his wife.
Secondly, the Bismarcks, father and son, were strongly
opposed to the influence of the English house in German affairs, and consequently were the avowed enemies of the Prince
and Princess of Wales.

Edward's sister, the Empress Frederick,

8

had tried vainly t as the 11beral English wife of

ai."1

enlightened

Crown Prince• to introduce the British method of representation and social raforn1 to Germany. The Bismarcks had helped

to block her ambitions and were suspicious of any of her
family•

Finally

the1~e

was the relationship between Edward

and his nephew the Emperor William ..
William had been thoroughly trained by the Bismarcks and

the tutors that they got for him to despise the ·policies of
his father

ru1d

mother. and had had a deep distrust of every-

thi?lt1 English instilled in ttim.

As a result, Y1ll1am and his

u."lcle were almost boun.cl to clash often.

William was inclined•

because he envied Edwardis position in the courts of Europe,
to insult him a:i'l.d play down to him at every opportunity.
This attitude on the part of his nephew more than once led to
such anger from Edward that a formal apology had to be forced
from William by his grand.mother. 12 Relations between the two
men were never, even at the best times, good, especially after
Edward became king.*
~fter

the affair at Fashod.a caused such an uproar in

France, Edward found. himself no longer welcome there.

He

* After the death or the Emperor Frederick, Edward visited
his sister in Germany, only to find that she was subjected to
every hwn111at1on by her son and by Bismarok, not even allowed
a proper house or freedom of movement.

treatment, Edward managed,

by

Very angry over her

threatening to tell all England

of her plight, to get her situation 1mproved.1J

9
we11-t instead. to take the .waters at Bad.en and to oontemplate

the practicality

ilf

an alliance with Germany.

During this

pe.riod he considered. this alignment of the countries in Eu.rope for the one and only time and gave it his tentative
support.

Long before

had forgiven him, he had forgiven

Fra.~ce

France and was again looking for ways to return their feelingo
for himself and Britain to their former warmth.

Concerning the French alliance, Edward had a long hiGtory of worldng for such an end..

As far back as 1866 Edward

had spoken in favour of the understa.ndine. with the French.
During the following years, a.s age and ability grooually made
a place for him in th9 t'.k'ust of his mother's cabinets, he was
to speak with the knowledge and backing of t11e foreign office.
Many French ambassadors to Britain became his friends in the
fashionable social world.
rule was U."ld.isputed.

or

London where the Prince of Wales•

Edward would have private audiences w1 th

them on the possibility of the British and French coming to
some ltind of

agreement.14

For a while after the overthrow of the Second Empire,
with which he had naturally been in olose sympathy, F..dward
stopped these informal talks.

However, the French continued

to send interesting and witty men to represent them in England,
and Edward was soon back on his old footing with them.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the first ambassador to really promote the Anglo-French entente as a
definite end came to London.
got along well.

Needless to say, he and Edward

This French ambassador was almost as important

10

to the entente as it was eventually set up, as the Cambon
embassy, which tends always to overshadow the importance of
this foreru."'lll.er.
h~ving

Courcel has not yet been recognized as

the importance that he had..

He was undoubtedly one

of France's most able diplomats and a real architect of the
future settlement between Britain and France.

was that he was in advance

or

his time.

His trouble

neither country was

ready ·ror what he was proposing, a.s they would be several
years later when Cambon took the London job. 1 .5
When Couroel began his campaign for an alliance with

Britain, his only real ally was the Prince of Walos. who
agreed with h1m completely and did everything in his power

to make oortain that Courcel got some kind of hearing in the
foreign office.
After he beoame king in January 1901 1 the1•e was an 1nte:rval of time before he could continue his visits to France.
In the first place there was all the planning of the coronation to attend to.

At the last moment Edward was struck with

appendicitis and the entire ceremony ha.d to be postponed for

several months.

Secor..d.ly, the situaticm with France, who was

still angry and humiliated over the Fashod.a affair and was
sympa.thetic with tte Boers in the unfortunate South African
war, made the visit of the king extremely difficult.
as

P~ince,

Even

virulent attacks in the French press had prevented

him from going as he usually did to France in 1900.

The

position of the king would be all the mo1•e troublesome.

Still, it was with France that Edward's natural sympathies

11

lay and he was determined to return to France and to do all
that he could to improve the relations between his country
and the French.

Edward ex,ressed his determination to undertake this
trip to his cabinet ea.rly in 1903.
difficulty.

Here he ran into fresh

1.,,a.nsd.ovme, who was now the Foreign Secretary,

objected to such a journey on the grounds that there was no
telling what tho French might resort to if they found the
king of the country which they so hated within their reach.
It coulcl only load. to a. situation t·ihere Britain would be in-

sulted to the point of making ·aar with France, something
that the govar11ment

or

Er-1.ta.in wan determined to avoid if

they could possibly do ~o. 16

The French government did not

share the feelings of its public, however, and the president
co:rd1ally invited the English king to stop

return part of'

Edwa1~s 1 s

delighted to accept.

111

Paris on the

first p:rogress as lting.

Edward was

Politics and Policies
When Edward VII became king, Salisbury was still Prime
Minister.

Throughout his tenure of office, both as Prime

Minister and as Foreign Secretary, Salisbury had been on the
side of an entente with France.

However. he was, also, un-

willing to give any leeway in the colonial situation, and so

his negotiating powers with the French were negated by his
stand~

This was espeoially true regarding the problem of

Egypt.

Still he was unwilling to write Off any discussion

between the French and the British.

Twice during various

terms in off ice the idea of talks between the two countries
had

been begun, only to be stopped by some occurrence on the

colonial scene.

However, 1n 1902 Salisbury was forced to give

up the foreign secretaryship, because ot ill health, which he
had

held tor some time consecutively with the prime m1n1ster-

I.ansdowne. under his no longer too watchful eye, became the Foreign Secretary for the conservative government. 17
sh1p.

Lansdowne, in 1902, was far more interested in an alli-

ance with Germany than in one with France. As far as he was
oonoerned the problems between the two countries precluded
any chance ot settlement.

Besides, he thought that there

were definite advantages to joining with Germany,. who was at
this time the fastest growing country economically.

Friendly

relations between these two powerful countries,, Britain
12

and

13
Germany, would have benefits for them both 1n the mater or
trade and in the colonial world. 18 In this feeling Lansdowne
had

the backing or several members

or

the cabinet, among

whom the one most to be reckoned with was Joseph Chamberlain.
The French were ready to negotiate for some time before
the British govex-nment finally got some united action on
what they wanted to do.

From the time that 'l'heophile Deloasse

ca.me to the off ice of foreign affairs he deo1ded that the
thing that would most benefit France was an alliance with
Britain•

Germany was the real threat, even though for a long

time the policy

or

Germany had been to back the desires of

the French in everything that they wished.. except the return

or

Alsaoe'!MLorraine.

Bismarck knew the value of keeping

France and Britain at odds.

However., in the eyes

or

France.

Germany's growing economic and military might was directed
pr1amr11y at the French•

Germany, not France, was to be the

dominant power 1n Europe.

Therefore• Deloasse had the resi-

dent ambassador or France 1n London, M· Paul cambon, sound
out the English a.gain on their feelings.
The French cause had a few ardent supporters among the
English even before there was a chance
discussion of an entente.

or

getting public

Salsibury, as noted, was agreeably

1nol1ned, while he was Foreign Minister, to have settlement

talks with France.

The impediment was France,

and.

her probt-

lem was to decide whom she hated more:
Fashoda, or Germany, because

or

England, because of
Alsaoe-Lorraine. 19 With

French Germanophobe reeling as· strong as it was, only one

14
answer was possible in the end.

Delcasse and the government

of France would be willing to come to some settlement.
Delcasse had a new situation on his side 1n playing up
to Britain, now.

France had just recently conolUded an entente

with Fussiat and the scene of Europe was divided into two
armed camps;
ance.

the Triple Alliance against the new Dual Alli-

Britain, in return, had just finished settling an

agreement with Japan, because she felt so left out or Europe.
What France saw oom1ng over the horizon was a war between
Japan and Russia.

As Russia's only ally, France would auto-

matically expect the Russians to ask them to keep the defensive
end of the agreement and help them (the Russians) against
Japan.

It France were to join Russia, then they might reasona-

bly expect Japan to call for the aid of Britain, and France
would find herself faced with war with the British Empire.
Even with the help of the Russian fleet. wh1oh had been
promised them if they needed it, Britain would win• almost
certainly.

To avoid war on these terms, it was imperative

that France find some way of coming to a settlement with
Britain. 20
However, the problem
measure still remained.

or

how to bring about this necessary

The French Third Republic was a

democracy of little stability.
the precedent
Any

or

Governments had already set

rising and falling with alarming frequency.

step that the government took would have to be supported

by the French public or the government would fall before it
could put its policy into action.

At that time the French

1.5
public was indulging itself in a veritable orgy of mud-slinging• directed at Britain because of Fashoda and because the

French took the side

or

the Boers.

Deloasse allowed his

feelings to be known in private conversations conducted both
in Paris and in his name in London by the French ambassador.
He explained that he was willing for the two countries. to
form an entente, but that with Frenoh public feelings as
they were chances of open success were minimal. 21
1

The English government was in a better position at home
to advocate an alliance with the French because the English
public had suddenly been thrown into outrage by the outspoken
opinions from the German Re1sohstag on the south African war.
That war was not exactly popular at home, but no one who was
not British had the right to insult a policy of the British
Empire

in

such terms.

The press hated Germany with a violent

passion, and the full force of English sarcasm was turned by
editors, even of the most reasonable papers, on the leaders
of the German government.22

At this point, Lansdowne would have been ready to come
to some type ot pr1bate terms with the French whether public
opinion in England had been agreeable or not.

Iansdowne had

reversed his stand 1n foreign affairs--nothi.ng was more re•
markable about Lanadowne•s conduct of the foreign office in
his early years there than his ability to shift his position••
and had decided that the only way for Britain to be able to

make a stand in the future on the continent was to have an
alliance of some kind with France.

The French ambassador in

16
London was notified from Deloasse to carry on informal talks

with Lansdowne 'E!ven though at the time there was no chance of
these becoming the stated policy of either country.
La.nsdowne•s change of position had a reasonable basis
for all its apparent suddeness.

The specter

or

a continental

coalition seemed about to lift its head. against Britain.
Germany was doing her best to lure France and her ally Russia
into the 'rriple Alliance*'

If she succeeded there would be

no one to side with Britain; her•splendid isolation" would
be guarenteed, not because she wanted it but because she had
no ohoioe.

Considering the colonial situation, where, every

European country with colonial ambitions found itself. blocked
by the Br1t1sh empire 1 the

ine~itable

result of such an

alliance would mean war against Britain by all the countries
in 1t. 24
M. Cambon had been 1nstruoted

by

Deloasse to bring up

the touohy subject of colonial conflict and to try for some
solution that would be agreeable to the English foreign
m1n1stry.

Siam and Morocco were the topics and the French

tentatively suggested that they were ready to find some
settlement.

As M· Cambon said• the English understood the

feeling of having to baok down from a position:

it affaoted

the prestige of the country that had to do it.

Therefore the

settlement would have to be one that allowed the French to
come out of the agreement with their pride and honour still
in taot.
Lansdowne said that he understood the situation of
France.

He decided that the beat way

or

overcoming the

17
colonial problem was to give up Morocco to the French.
Cambon, for his part, agreed that England should be allowed
the rights in Egypt.

These agreements were secret, since

neither the English people nor the French were prepared to
accept a settlement between their two countries. 2S In other
words, the agreement between the two countries was essentially settled, except for working out the details.

The

problem was still public acceptance, the bugbear to all
international diplomacy.
At this moment the setermination of the king to
visit France, while it might have the unhappy results that
several cabinet members thought, might,on the other hand,
improve the situation between Britain and France to where the
discussions could be made public.

Edward himself thought

that this might be the result and was anxious to try out
his abilities.

Therefore, on the return leg of his journey

around the Iberian penisula and Italy, Edward stopped in
Paris.~~

There was little enough enthusiasm shown him as he gob
off of the train 1n Paris•

President Loubet was the only

one there who seemed glad to see the king.

(Loubet was the

one who had so cordially invited the king to stop in Paris,
so that Delcasse•s Entente might have a chance.)

The

Parisians observed the king's progress through the city
with sullen faces or with cries of •vive FashodaJ•

Ed.~ard

took no notice of the frigidity 1n the air and responded
to what salutes were offered him.

When one of his aides

spoke seriously to him as they were going into the embassy

18
and said that the French did not like them, Edward replied,

truthfully enough,"Why should they?"
no reason to _...,. yet.27

He meant that they had

i'hat night Edward went to the opera, where the atmo-

sphere was scarcely less oh1lly than it had been that morning.
There are too many conflicting reports on what Edward

ac~ually

said or did during the intermission, when he paid such warm
attention to a notable Frenchwoman, for anything to
down as raot.

be

set

Whatever the o1rcumstances, the news that the

English king could be so gallant and sympathetic, and spoke

suoh excellent Pranoh,

raced all over Paris by morning.

Parisians began to remember who this k1ng was:

The

not someone

of whom they had never heard who came to them as the Russian
Emperor had, with unsm1ling countenance and conso1ous

superiority of his titles and power, who insulted their
democracy with his looks, but someone whom they knew well.

It was that same prince who had always visited and loved
France, A boulivardier like themselves, who loved and under•
stood them.

The frigidity Of the day before was almost

melted by the time he drove out the next day. 28
Both the Parisians and the English in Paris were eager

to hear what the king had in mind when he rose to address
them, and through them the whole

or

their countries.

It is scarcely necessary to tell you with
what sincere pleasure I find myself once
more in Paris, to which, as you know, I
have pais very frequent visits with ever
increasing pleasure, and for which I reel
an attachment fortified by so many happy
and ineffaoable memories. The days of
hostility between the two countries are,
I am certain, happily at an end. There

19
may have been misunderstandings and causes
of dissension in the past, but that is all
happily over and forgotten. The friendship
of the two countries is my oonstant preoccupation, and I count on you all who enjoy
French hospitality in their magnificent city
to aid me to reach this goal. 29

This mention of friendship between the two countries, which
Edward put so carefully in a prominent place in his speech,

was supposed to mean more than the king could openly speak
of, but the undertones were strong enough to come through.
Edward was firmly baoking the entente, and was asking the

French whom he had just won to his side to support him

their leaders willingly.

and

His speech affected the position

of both countries in the world·
By the time Edward left Paris the French were literally

at his feet.

uv1ve notre ro1ru

to the change were a.mazed.
amazed than any.

Most people who were witnesses

The English were probably more

All the countries

or

Europe knew their

king better than they whom he ruled did.JO

The Discussions Between Lansdowne and Cambon
With the certainty that their agreements would be
accepted in both their countries, Lansdowne and Cambon
were able to go on with their talks.

Though the main

issues had been mentioned and agreed to there were still
the details to be worked out and the minor items needed to
be inserted in their proper places.
The foreign secretary of Britain, in discussing the
matter, had come to several conclusions.

In letters exchanged 1

between Lansdowne and Cromer, the British consul-general
in Egypt, certain points were decided on.

They agreed

that France should have the rights in Morocco, provided
that Britain would get the rights in Egypt, that the sea
coast of Morocco would be neutralized, and that British
trade would not be put under any special restrictions.

If

all these points were acknowledged by the French, then there
would be no problem.3 2
The French had some points in mind also.

They wanted

the director-general of Antiquities in Egypt :bo remain a
Frenchman, and they wanted the French schools that had been
established in Egypt to remain in French hands and not to
be at a disadvantage in the English governed province.
Both of these problems were settled in the discussions.
In addition, they agreed that Spain, because of her proximity
to Morocco, should receive special assurances of good will
~o
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from the

t\fO

countries and should get the same benef 1ts

that France was going to allow Britain to have..

No forti-

fications would be built along the coast opposit Gibraltar
and Spain would be allowed to have as a sphere of influence
any territory that the sultan of Moz•oooo was supposed to
control outside of Melilla-

These last agreements were

under the secret settlement part of the enyente as it was

written.
otha~

The problems that France and Britain had had in

parts of their colonies, for example in Newfoundland,

were not specifically mentioned in the

agre~ment

that

Lansdowne and Cambon signed, but they were d1sousned and

settled.33

The Aftermath
To anyone casually examining the results or the d1scuss1ona and the treaty. it would seem that Britain got the
'best of the bargain.

She got something that already existed

and. which she in faot already controlled:

the province

or

Egypt• which was well set up, ready tor them to govern,
and.

in which trade was already established.

France got

a chaotic country without any government
could control it,
anyone could guess at the time.
In actuality, France got the best
two reasons.

or

the deal, for

First, Morocco proved to be a largely under-

developed. d.ountry that had great potential.

She became a.

valuable area tor trade: her wealth had been hidden, not
nonexistant.

Secondly, Delcasse knew what he was doing

when ho settled the entente with the British as he did.
The French, e.s it worked out, had paid their end or the
ba.rgain:
had

England had full sway in Egypt.

However, they

taken the promisecithe British for things to oome.

The British could not fail to support the
without seriously

da.~aging

Fren~h

their good name.

in Boroooo

Delca.sse

almost certainly knew that Germany would hardly let such
influence grow in Africa without challenging 1t on dlehalf

of their growing empire there.

The British would

be

forced

to help the French against the Germans, who could be counted
-oJ...
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on to start the rouble.

It would not only aid the French

in Africa but would strengthen the ties of the §ntenpe.35
The British were not looking for such long term effects.
It was the apparent that they appreciated, not the fact,
and they thoUght that they had gotten the best end of the

agreement.

The settlement bill passed with great popularity

in the House of Commons.

In the final analysis• the praise for the entente
rests with four people.

Deloasse is the first, beoau.se he

held to his idea of an agreement with Britain through all

the instability of a government of the Third Hepublia
was successful in the end.

a.'11d

Cambon is the seoondt because

he sat down and went through the settlement point by point
during all the long months of negotiations.

Lansdowne

is the third• because in the end, when once he.bad been
convert~d

to the idea of an alliance with France, he supported

it whole...heartedly and to the best interests of Britain

as he saw them.
However, the man who most influenced the successful
outcome

or

the negotiations that had been carried on between

Britain and France was Edward·

Without his popularity and h

his charm the Anglo-French Entente would not have been
possible.

It was he who removed the barriers that would

have prevented the French government from agreeing to the
enteµte and getting it through the Chambers in their assembly.
He showed them Englishmen who had the best

intere~ts

of both

countries in mind. 1 not for the benefit of empire but in

common good.

thei~

'1:('~ j
good tbcir rights to tl1t: ,ucccs•.irin, witholll :tny risl: <Jf ''-';·i(Jw; interference
on our p:trt, i-1c>rcv:cu \1·ill, to :ill intent; :rnd 1n11 pose:'., LC'cornc !Jcfo~·c ]('!lg
a Frcncli pru1·i 1cc.
The l]Uc:,til>ll, thn<'fm(" lei n1y mirid i:; tlii.~: li:1vc we :-u1y c,Jijccrir,n u,
1'.fornccu hccCJniint~ a Fn:·wl1 pr(lvi11cc; J'cr.\r11J:illy, I ~u· 111111c, pni\·i1L:d
always (r) t!ut \\'t get all adccp1:1lc <Jllid f'i'O quo in Egypt a11d chcwhcrc;
and (2) t\:~:t the French c"1np1y \\.'itli ynur thee co1Jditirn1s :1s rc:g.1rcls
1'.forocrn. These:, if I u1Hlcrst:1nd rigl.tly, :1rl· (1) tl1<.: ~c:1Lci:ird i:; tu be neutralised; (2) a proper regard .i~ to he slHi\\'Il tu Sp:rnish inicrcsts :llld susceptibilities; :incl (3) J guaralltfe is to bc.: obt:1i11ecl that British trade and
enterprise ,,·ill not be placed at any legal dis:1cl\'Jntage in Morocco.
1

[Declaration between the United Kingdom and France: rtspccting Egypt
and l\forocco. Signed at London, April 8, 190.;.]

Article I.
His Britannic Majesty's Government declare tli:it they h:ivc no intention

of altering the political status of Egypt.
The Go\'ernmcnt of the french Republic, for their part, dccbre that they
will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in th:it country by asking that
a limit of time be fixed for the British occup:nion or in any other manner,
and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivi:il Decree :innexed to the
present Arrangernrnt, containing the gu:1r;1ntcc.:s rnnsidcrccl ncccss:1ry f"r
the protection of th<.: interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the ccm·Jition
th:it, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any w:iy without the
consent,, of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1 SS5.
·It is agreed that the post of Director-General of ;\ntiquities in Egypt shall
continue, as in the past, to be entrustccl to a French savant.
The French schools in Egy1Jt shall continue to enjoy the s:1me liberty as
in the past.

Article II.
The Government of the French Republic dccbre that they have no 111tention of alterin" the politic1l sutus of Morocco.
His Drit:innic1'Lijcsty's Cowrnrnc11l, fnr tk:ir F'.rt, recognise that it :ippertains to Fr:rncc, rnort p:irticubrly :is a Power \\'ho:-.c domi11in11s :ire contermilltd!S for a grc:1t cli.'l:ilkc \\'ith tlt(i>e of !-forocco, to prcsn\'C (lrdn in
th:1t co:i11try, :rnd tu pro\'ick :issist:rncc for the pur1ws·c of all :1clmi11istr:HiYc,
ecrnwm~.:, fi11.m·:i.1l, ;111d rnilir;iry reforms \\'liicli it m:1y rCl]llirc.
They dccbre th;ir thcv will. not (lktruct the action taken liy Fr.111cc for
tl1is p11;11ci\t', pr"'·icbl 1!:.11 >II< Ii :c<ti"n sl1.1ll !t'.t\'\' i111.1c1 t11c 1i1~li1-; \\'l1i«li
(;1r.1I l~1i1;1i1i, i11 \ill!/\' of '!'1!'.lli1-;, (:11/l\Tltli1111·., ;111d 11·.. 1.:',<' ('!IJi!)"· Ill

,1s~

lZE1\Dl:\'CS Ji"-: H!l\(JJ'L\:'< J]i\'JUiZY <i:<CL i~~1.1 jr:'h/•. Xii/

.Morocco, inch1din~; th('. right <if C(J:Jstifl'.' tr:1dc b~:t\'/ 1 :cn tli'.: pun·; of ~1forr1:;cr,
enjoyed by J;ritishL ve:svJc >in cc.: I'.,)'Ji. ''
- '

Article Ill.
His Ilrit:rnnic M:ijc:;ty's Gm·c:rnmcnt, for their part, will rcs?_:n the rif~l1:,
wliicl1 Fr:1ncc, in \'irt11c of Trc1tics, CrJ11vrntir111s, :rnrl 11sa,;;c, enjoys in Fgypt,
includi11g the ri~;lit fJ[ cwsti11g tL1dc between Fgypti:111 port~, acc1,nbl tfJ
Frrnch vcs,cls.

Article IV.
The two Governments, being cqt1:1lly attacher! to the principle of C<Jmrnerci:d libcrt y both in Egypt and MrJrocu,, dccbre tl1at they will nrJt, i11
those countries, countenance :my i1icr1uality either in the imposition of cmtoms duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.
The trade of both nations with ~forocrn and with Egypt sh:ill enjoy the
same treatment in transit through the French :rnd Briri,Ji pmses:;iom in
Africa. An Agreement between the two Governmems sh:ill settle the con<litions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.
This mutual eng:1gement shall be liincling for a period of thirty years.
Unless this s:ipubtion is expressly clenouncecl at lc:ist one year in advance,
the period shall be extended for fi \'C years at a ti me.
Nevertheless, the GoYernment of the French Republic reserve to themselves in J\forocco, and His Ilritannic Majesty's Go\'ernment reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railw:1ys, ports,
&c., arc only gr:rnted 011 such conclitirim as \\'iii m:1i1Jt:1i11 i11t:1ct the :1uthority
of the St:1tc O\'cr these great unclert:il;ings of pulilic i111erest.

Article V .
. His Britannic Majesty's Gm·crnment declare th:it they will use their influence in order that. the French oJlicials now in t11e Egypti:1n scr\'icc may
not be pbcccl under conditions ks-; aclv:mtageous tli:rn thosl'. applyini.; tu the
British officials in the same sen·ice.
The Gm·ernment of the French Republic, for t11cir part, would m:1ke no
objection to the applic:1tion of an:1logous conditions w British onici:ils 110\':
in the 1\foorish service.

Article VI.

In order to insure the free pass:1~e of the Suez C:111:1!, Jiis lhit:mnic :\hjesty's Government clccl:ire th:H they adhere tn the >cipubtio11~ of the Treaty
of the 29th Oct(lkr, '""':. and tl1:1t the\' a~i«:e tn their kinu put in lllrcr·.
Th('. free pass:l<'C of t!w C:rn:1l k'in~ tl1:1s ~'t1:1Llntccd, the c~Yt1tion nf t11«
J:iq ~c11trn<c rl'1,:1r:1;;r:q1l1 1 :is \':l·ll
c1f p.:;.";'.1:111!1 :>(If .\r1i, le \'Iii ril- tl1,1t
'f1c:1ty will rrn1:1i11 i11 ;1ky.111ll'.

>s

Article 1/11.
In or<l-cr to secure the free p:tss:!ge uf tlic Slr;:its (Jr Cihr:1lt:1r, t!l"c t\','C>
Go\·crnmcnts agree not to permit the: erection cJ :rny Lniflr::1tirn1.', 1;1 slr:rtcgic
wci:ks on th:1t portion of the cu:iot <Jf ~lfoff<C:J crni1r1ri«c-cl b~t\\'tu1, l1ut not
including, Me:lilb :me! tlic heights whid1 uM1!!1:tnd the right l1:11Jl: rif the
Riwr Sd;ou.
This condition clues not, however, :1pply to the pL1ccs :1t prc,cnt 111 tl:c
occup:ition of Sp:iin on the )\foori,]1 rn:::,t uf the Mcclitcrr:111c:i11.

Article VIII.
The two Co\'crnmcnts, inspired liy their fctling of sincere frirnclship for
Sp.1in, take into spcci:il consideration the interests which tl1:it coumry clcri\'cs
from her geogr:iphical position and from her territori:il pos'.cssions on the
1vfoorish co:ist of the Mecliterr:inean. In regard to these interests the French
Go\'ernrnent \\'ill come to an underst:inding with the Spanish Government.
The agreement which m:iy be come to· on the subject bctwe\'.11 France
and Spain sh:ill be communicatccl to His Brit:innic Majesty's Government.

Article IX.
The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplom::itii:
support, in order to obt:iin the execution of the cbuscs of the present Declaration reg:irding Egypt :incl i\forocco.
In witness whereof his Excellency the r\mbassaclor of the French Republic at the Court of His Maje>ty the King of the United Kingdom of
Gre:it Brit:iin and Ireland and of the British Dominion' beyond i.he Sc:is,
Emperor of India, :ind His Majesty's Princip:il Secret:iry of State for foreign
Ai1airs, duly authorized for that purpose, bve ,igned the pre,rnt Dechr;1tion and h;1vc :ilfo:ed thereto their seals.
Done at Lo11don, in duplicate, the Sth (by of J\pril, I<)')i(Sign:itures of Lord Linsdownc and M. Paul Cambon follow.)
Secret Article !.

In the event of either Government finding themselves comtrained, hy the
force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt and l\forocco, the engagements which they h;ivc undertaken to\\'arcls c;icl1 otl1cr by
Articles IV, Vl nnd Vll of the Dcclar:itioll of tu-clay's d:ite \<,'C1tdd rern:1i11
inuct.
Secret Article fl.
His Rit~111nic ?-.fajcsty's Go\"crnmcnt h:lYC llO present intrntion uf prupl>Sing to the I\•\1·crs :my cli:111gcs in tl1,· sp.tcm nf tlit· C1pituhti,>t1', (11 i11 tlk
(If l;.\')'j'I.
ti
J"udici:d r,r,,_1lli,.1ti<11l
1.. I
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EUlUJi'L\~< I

iJ.S'JUin '.-iJ:< 1 :1: 1':;;

I U1,·1"

Xii!

ck,i::1L 1,_.u,intrr;(1uv

Inti1cevcntoftlJCircomidni11~; it
i:1 i.{~)pl ref•,;·:,,
te11dinf'; to ;is,irnihtc tlic Egyptid11 kgishtiw :,y:,tc;n't(J tltdl i:1 iurcc i1; c'1l:·.·;
civilisu: COll!llries, the Go\'ern111c11t of the· J.'rcwl1 lzq,11L!ic \·:ill 11r1t rd:h•.:
to c11lcrl:1i11 :lily such jll'"j'(1:,:1b, ci11 1l1r 111HL1-.L1ndi11,'.', 1)1:!( ] Ji•, l!rit:11 11 ,:,_
1'fajc.'oi)'\ (;()\'l'rJil11e11t will :1grcc to l'Itl< rl:1i11 tLr: :,11t:.~;1·'oli 1 i11•; il1:1l tl11· (;"1·ernmenl of the Frrnch ]{epulilic may k1'.'<~ to rn:rl:e tr' tl1un wi1h :r l'iei'.' c,f
introch1cing simihr reforms in fllorocco.

Secret Article Ill.
The two Governments agree that a cert:ii11 extent of ~1foori,Ji territory
adjacent to :Mclilb, Ceuta and other Presides ~lwulcl, whenever the Sultan
ceases to exercise :iuthority over it, come witl1in the sphere of influence of
Sp:1i11, :ind tli:ll the :iclministr:1tion of the co:1st from Mclill:i :1s f:ir a~;, but not
i11cluding, tlie hcighb on the right li:111l: o( the Sdiou ~lt:tll lie i11lrt1\tcd lrJ
Spain.
Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her form:il :isscnt to
the provisions of Articles IV and VII of the Declaration of to-tby's <late, and
undertake to carry tl1cm out.
She would also have to undertake not to alienate the \\'hole or :i part of
the territories placed under her authority or in her ~phcre of innurnce.
Secret Article H'.

If Spain, when invited to assent to the prnvisirn1s (JI the preceding

~r1i1.ic,

should think proper to dccli11e, the 1\rr:ir1gcmrnt bctv:ccn 1:r:1ncc a11cl (;rc:ll
Brit::iin, ::is embodied in the Decbraticin of tod:iy's tbtc, would be none the
less applicdilc.
Secret Article V.
Should the consent of the otlH:r Powers lo tl1c drafL Deuce mentir1:1cd 111
Article I of the Dcclar:ition of lo-day's tbtc not be 0~1t.iinccl, the Govcr1ll!K'il'.
of the French Republic \\'ill not oppos<: tlie rcpay111e11t at p.ir of the Cu 1ra11tccd, Privileged :incl Unifil'cl Ddits after tl1c 151h ]lily, lljIO.
Done :it I,011rl1>11, i11 rlu11lic.1tc, tl1:~ ~:,]i chy ,,f .\pril, "/'-i·
(Sign;iturcs of L()rrl l,:!Jlsdt1\\lle and ;-.1, 1'.1lll C!ml1011 fo!lo1-.·.)
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